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I. INTRODUCTION
Worldwide, future access to essential prescription
medicines remains undetermined as pharmaceutical companies
and governments try to balance affordability and availability
while preserving intellectual property (IP) standards.1 This di-
lemma is exacerbated in many countries of Central and South
America, where the infectious disease burden is great.2 These
diseases, including HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, have
been eradicated or afflict a much smaller percentage of the pop-
ulation in more developed countries. 3 In Central and South
America, however, only 5 of the 34 countries in the region even
have the capabilities to manufacture pharmaceutical products
without importing ingredients. 4 Considering the public health
implications of restricting medication accessibility and the lack
of pharmaceutical resources, developing countries (DCs) and
least developed countries (LDCs) have been historically reluc-
tant to legislate IP criteria. 5
The affirmation of IP, such as the issuance of patents in-
cluding those governing pharmaceutical products, are tradition-
ally part of Western culture. 6 Patents are granted to give an
inventor the right to own his invention and to reward him for
his contribution to better some aspect of society.7 Most devel-
oped countries adopted these ideals and supported the develop-
ment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
incorporated the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
1 See World Trade Organization, Cancdn: The Real Losers are the Poor (Sept.
18, 2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03-e/news-sp-18sepO3-e.
htm.
2 See Mary Moran & Nathan Ford, The G8 and Access to Medicines: No More
Broken Promises, 361 LANCET 1578 (2003), at http://www.lancet.com (last visited
Nov. 23, 2004).
3 See id.
4 See Carlos M. Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG. ESSENTIAL POLICIES & MED. 13
(June 2002), at http://www.who.int/medicines/library/par/who-edm-par-2002-3/
doha-implications.doc (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Correa, Implications
of Doha].
5 See John A. Harrelson, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIVIAIDS
Crisis: Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Com-
passion, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 175, 187 (2001).
6 See id.
7 See id.
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lectual Property (TRIPS) in 1994.8 The overall goals of this
agreement were to promote advances in technology, distribu-
tion, and conveyance of new technological advances, and to play
a role in "the mutual advantage of producers and users of tech-
nological knowledge in a manner conducive to social and eco-
nomic welfare."9
Simultaneous to the WTO discussions on IP, trade, and the
development of TRIPS, talks emerged around the creation of a
free trade zone encompassing the Americas. The Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) is a proposed agreement modeled
after the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA), to be made
among 34 democratic countries of the Americas, excluding
Cuba.' 0 Formal negotiations started in 1998 and are set to
culminate in December 2005.11 The success of the larger FTAA
agreement is founded on the smaller, usually bilateral, Free
Trade Agreements (FTAs) made between the United States and
a targeted country.12 Concurrently, Canada is pursuing bilat-
eral and smaller multilateral FTAs with Central and South
American countries. 13
This article will focus on the recent developments of the
FTAA in light of the post-TRIPS negotiations. Some of the lat-
est legislative decisions made by Central and South American
countries favor provisions that actually involve stricter IP stan-
dards than the original TRIPS agreement set forth.14 The dis-
cussion will review the effects of these additional provisions in
the negotiations of trade agreements with the United States in
8 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round 31, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
9 M. Kent Ranson et al., The Public Health Implications of Multilateral
Trade Agreements, in HEALTH POLICY IN A GLOBALISING WORLD 18 (Kelley Lee et
al. eds., 2002).
10 Tanja Sturm, MSF Activists Urge Latin American Countries to Fight
'TRIPS-Plus' Provisions in FTAA Negotiations, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Aug.
29, 2003.
11 See id.
12 See Free Trade Deals: What You Don't See May Be What You Get, GLOBAL
ECONOMIC JUSTICE REPORT, V. 2(1), p. 1-12, February 2003 [hereinafter Free Trade
Deals].
13 See id.
14 See Rebecca Palser, "TRIPS-Plus" Provisions Set for Inclusion in US-Chile
FTA, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Nov. 28, 2002.
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the Central and South American region. This article will also
present new developments that focus on preserving public
health initiatives for access to essential medications.
Part II provides the historical background of the modifica-
tions and clarifications made to the TRIPS document regarding
pharmaceutical access over the past five years and the main
events leading up to these changes. In addition, Part II will
present a review of the proposed solutions for developing coun-
tries that, if implemented, would potentially appease TRIPS
proponents, yet continue to provide needy populations with es-
sential medicines. In addition, Part II will continue with a dis-
cussion of the current status of applying TRIPS to public health
initiatives in DCs and LDCs.
Part III will discuss the formation of the FTAA, including
the purpose of the agreement, the countries targeted, and the
benefits of these agreements. The approaches to IP protections
and pharmaceutical access of three Central and South Ameri-
can countries, Brazil, Chile, and Guatemala, in preparation for
the FTAA, will be highlighted.
Part IV will examine the implementation of TRIPS through
the FTAA and smaller FTA agreements, specifically focusing on
the access to prescription medications and generic equivalents.
This section will also review the current status of the FTAA ne-
gotiations and the future outlook on pharmaceutical access for
Central and South Americans.
II. TRIPS DEVELOPMENT, REFINEMENT AT DOHA, AND
FUTURE OUTLOOK
One of the driving forces of developing the TRIPS agree-
ment was to create universal standards for patents on pharma-
ceutical products. 15 The Intellectual Property Committee (IPC),
a' collaboration of 12 transnational corporations based in
America, along with the International Intellectual Property Al-
liance and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America, heavily influenced the conception of the TRIPS agree-
15 See TRIPS, Intellectual Property Rights and Access to Medicines, HIV/AJDS
ANTIRETROVIRAL NEWSLETTER (WHO, Regional Office for the Western Pacific), Dec.
2002, at 1 [hereinafter HIV Newsletter].
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ment.16 The TRIPS agreement encapsulated many of the pat-
ent protections these corporations enjoyed in the United States
to worldwide applicability.17 Patents rights were broadened to
limit exceptions to these rights and to strengthen the restric-
tions on compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical products.' 8
While TRIPS set out minimum standards for IP protection, the
agreement also included enforcement and dispute resolution
procedures with a compliance date of January 2005 for all WTO
Members.19
The incorporation of TRIPS into the global pharmaceutical
industry by the 2005 deadline soon revealed that this agree-
ment was going to have very broad applications to public health
initiatives around the world.20 Thus, the application of the
TRIPS agreement has been a source of controversy for pharma-
ceutical companies, governments, non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), and human rights organizations worldwide.
2
'
Essentially, "the introduction of... TRIPS standards ... delay
the marketing of generic version of new drugs, and, thus the
competition they entail. Hence it is anticipated that the prices
of new drugs will remain high for a longer period of time, which
will result in reduced access for many people, notably in devel-
oping countries."22 However, right after the initial TRIPS
agreement was issued, NGOs and activists publicized the public
health implications of the agreement and the WTO has slowly
responded. 23
The main social deliberation has been whether patents on
pharmaceutical products are rights or privileges. 24 Pharmaceu-
tical companies purport to have the ability to limit the distribu-
16 See Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 481, 481, 485-89 (2002) [hereinafter Sell, Access Campaign].
17 See Carlos M. Correa, TRIPS Disputes: Implications for the Pharmaceutical
Sector, QUNO.COM (June 2001), at http://www.geneva.quno.info/pdf/OP5.pdf (last
visited Nov. 23, 2004).
18 See id.
19 See Sell, Access Campaign, supra note 16, at 489. See also TRIPS Agree-
ment, supra note 8, art. 65, para. 4.
20 See id. at 497.
21 See generally Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Be-
tween Commercial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14
FLA. J. INT'L L. 193 (2002) [hereinafter Sell, Post-TRIPS].
22 See Hiv NEWSLETTER, supra note 15.
23 See generally Sell, Post-TRIPS, supra note 21.
24 See Sell, Access Campaign, supra note 16, at 497.
2004]
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tion of drugs by claiming IP rights.25 Many public health
advocates see the enforcement of patents as a privilege, where
the privilege can be revoked when there are higher reaching
goals such as public health emergencies. 26
The TRIPS agreement was not developed around an access
to essential medications or a public health initiative. Therefore,
the world's population has not had an opportunity to realize the
potential complications of the agreement made by trade and
business elitists, especially if IP is deemed a "right."27 In the
ensuing years since the enactment of the TRIPS agreement,
many activists, NGOs, and the World Health Organization
(WHO), have petitioned the WTO and its members to reconsider
the agreement in light of the public health implications on de-
creased access to pharmaceuticals.28
A. WTO Ministerial Conventions Respond to Pharmaceutical
Access Concerns
The first ministerial convention to address the limitations
that the TRIPS agreement created on pharmaceutical access
was held in 1999 in Seattle, Washington. 29 At that time, there
was an enormous debate on the availability and pricing of an-
tiretroviral (ARV) drugs for the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa.30
In assumed compliance with TRIPS, the South African govern-
ment, for example, had enacted the South African Medicines
and Related Substances Control Act Amendments.31 The pur-
pose of these amendments was to make ARV drugs affordable to
its infected populace. 32 After their enactment, many lawsuits
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 See John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 576
(2000).
28 See Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Op-
tions Under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, 117
(2003).
29 See Ellen 't Hoen, Public Health and International Law: TRIPS, Pharma-
ceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way From Seattle to
Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 34 (2002).
30 See id. at 30.
31 See Rosalyn S. Park, The International Drug Industry: What the Future
Holds for South Africa's HIVIAIDS Patients, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 136
(2002).
32 See Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa's Intellectual Prop-
erty Fight for Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 257, 269 (2002).
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ensued from pharmaceutical companies around the world.
33
Under much pressure from humanitarians and the media, Pres-
ident Clinton and other world leaders vowed to help South Af-
rica and other nations in their plight against HIV/AIDS.
34
Regardless, the Seattle convention did little to change the ex-
pectations of implementing TRIPS in all WTO-participating
countries by the 2005 deadline.
35
In 2001, the WTO convened again in Doha, Qatar, shifting
their focus to the public health initiatives of DCs and LDCs
with the 2005 implementation deadline looming.36 Some signif-
icant public health commitments were solidified at Doha in the
"Doha Declaration."37 As stated in the declaration, "We agree
that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
members from taking measures to protect public health."
38 One
of the most significant benefits for DCs and LDCs was the ex-
tension of the deadline for enacting TRIPS IP protections into
law until 2016. 3 9
B. Proposed Solutions in the Doha Declaration on Public
Health
The Doha Declaration was created to address the ways that
DCs and LDCs could circumvent IP issues and gain access to
prescription medications, utilizing options under the TRIPS
agreement.40 Specific articles in the TRIPS agreement allowed
for exceptions, including article 30 patent exceptions and article
31 compulsory licensing mechanisms. 41 Other alternative ways
to skirt restrictive IP laws, which may be feasible for DCs and
LDCs in the future, are parallel importing, patent exhaustion,
and subsidies. 42
33 See id. at 261.
34 See id. at 272.
35 See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 35.
36 See id. at 38.
37 See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 1.
38 World Trade Organization, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreements
and Public Health, para. 5(c), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoe/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_tripse.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2004) [here-
inafter Doha Declaration].
39 See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 41.
40 See id. at 40.
41 See generally Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4.
42 See Harrelson, supra note 5, at 197.
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C. Article 31 Exceptions
One of the major debates after the TRIPS agreement was
how DCs and LDCs could benefit from the compulsory licensing
mechanism described in Article 31.4 3 A compulsory license is
defined as "[a] statutorily created license that allows certain
parties to use copyrighted material without the explicit permis-
sion of the copyright owner in exchange for a specified roy-
alty."44 Historically, DCs and LDCs have not used compulsory
licensing to access essential medicines during public health cri-
ses.45 However, under the Doha Declaration, much liberty has
been given to these countries to use compulsory licenses as a
tool for meeting their pharmaceutical needs.46
There are a few other ways countries might utilize compul-
sory licensing and still be compliant with TRIPS.47 One mecha-
nism is parallel compulsory licensing where the importing
country's compulsory license is duly recognized by the exporting
country. 48 While the mechanism appears simple, this solution
is procedurally difficult to implement.49 For example, the ex-
43 See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 40. TRIPS Agreement, Article 31(b) states, inpart, "such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commer-
cial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a
reasonable period of time." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31.
44 See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 931 (7th ed. 1999).
45 See Frederick M. Abbott, WTO TRIPS Agreement and Its Implications forAccess to Medicines in Developing Countries, IPRCOMMISSON.ORG (Feb. 14, 2002).Abbott provides several reasons why DCS have not used compulsory licensing,
including:
(1) The TRIPS Agreement has only recently begun to increase the inci-dence of patent protection; (2) use has been opposed by developed country
WTO Members and interested industry groups within them, and a strong
political commitment to act in the face of this opposition is required; (3)
some developing countries have expressed concern regarding a potentialbacklash from foreign direct investors; (4) developing country enterprises
may find it easier to reach accommodation with foreign patent holdersthan to challenge them through the compulsory licensing process for vari-
ous economic and administrative reasons; and . . . (5) effectively imple-
menting compulsory licensing requires that certain preconditions related
to administrative, financial and technical capacity be met, and these con-
ditions are often not met in developing countries.
Id.
46 See id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol16/iss2/8
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porting country is still required to retain the principal portion of
its product in the domestic market, and the exporting country
must have legislation in place to be able to accept the importing
country's license. 50 Other alternatives, such as regional patents
or creating pharmaceutical production export zones, are also
available to countries in need of importing essential medicines,
but have yet to be utilized widely.
51
D. Other Flexibilities Under TRIPS
Article 30 of TRIPS also provides some narrow exceptions
to pharmaceutical and other issued patents.
52 The exporting
country is in charge of determining whether to authorize patent
exceptions under this regulation, following the criteria set out
in the Article.53 Article 30 provides a different flexibility from
Article 31, as stated in footnote 7 of Article 31.
5 4 The text
clearly supports that Article 31 compulsory licensing proce-
dures are distinguishable from Article 30 patent exceptions.
55
Some commentators have also recommended the practice of
parallel importation for LDCs to get pharmaceuticals.
56 Paral-
lel importation is defined as "[gloods bearing valid trademarks
that are manufactured abroad and imported into [a country] to
compete with domestically manufactured goods."
57 Typically, a
drug manufacturer offers its pharmaceutical products at differ-
ent prices around the globe. 58 The benefit of parallel importing
50 See Abbott, supra note 45.
51 See id. A regional patent system involves several countries coming to-
gether to issue a common compulsory license. The requirement of supplying the
domestic market could be met by classifying the group market as the domestic
market. Id.
52 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 30.
53 See Abbott, supra note 45. See also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art.
30, which states, "members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict
with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests
of third parties." Id.
54 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31. Footnote 7 to Article 31
states, "'Other use' refers to use other than that allowed under Article 30." Id.
55 See id.
56 Id.
57 See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 44, at 1136.
58 See Thomas F. Mullin, Comment, AIDS, Anthrax, and Compulsory Licens-
ing: Has the United States Learned Anything? A Comment on Recent Decisions on
20041
9
PACE INT'L L. REV.
is that the countries can shop around the world for optimum
pricing.59 The downside is that pharmaceutical companies real-
ize a smaller profit margin with parallel importing, and in turn,
their interests in funding research and development for the in-
fectious diseases that burden DCs and LDCs may be reduced. 60
The Doha Declaration also elucidated the use of patent ex-
haustion as a potential means for increasing pharmaceutical ac-
cess. 61 Patent exhaustion has been defined as, "once the patent
holder has sold a patented invention, the patent holder has no
further right to exclude others from subsequent use, including
offering to sell or distribute the patented invention .. . "62
There are currently many limitations to patent exhaustion
under national laws. DCs and LDCs would have to adopt na-
tional exhaustion policies, which to date, they have been hesi-
tant to implement.63
Subsidies are a consideration for assisting countries in ob-
taining much-needed drugs, especially for combating HIV/AIDS
epidemics.64 The International Intellectual Property Institute(IIPI) put forth a plan that takes the focus off of the patent de-
bate and shifts it towards pricing issues.65 The proposal in-
cludes separating countries by ability to afford
pharmaceuticals, structuring prices based on this affordability
scale, and forming a worldwide "system of subsidies" for coun-
tries at the bottom of the affordability scale. 66 This plan, how-
ever, requires many stages to implement effectively, including
national exhaustion of patent rights, tiered pricing of
pharmaceuticals, bulk purchasing options, and a World Bank to
coordinate fundraising efforts. 67 Similarly, another potential
the International Intellectual Property Rights of Pharmaceutical Patents, 9 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 192 (2002).
59 See id.
60 See Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 57, 65 (2002).
61 See Doha Declaration, supra note 38, para. 5(d).
62 James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS
and Public Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARv.
J.L. & TECH. 291, 308 (2002).
63 See id. at 309.
64 Harrelson, supra note 5, at 197.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 197-98.
67 See id. at 198-99.
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solution is to have the significant debt owed by DCs and LDCs
forgiven so as to enable them to redirect resources toward re-
ducing disease burdens.
68
As trade and public health advocates discuss possible solu-
tions for DCs and LDCs to comply with TRIPS, global support
for infectious disease treatment and prevention activities are
diminishing.6 9 This past July, for example, at the European do-
nors conference to fight AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, the
donations fell short of the expected amounts. 70 Unfortunately,
as scientific technology has advanced with effective treatments
for these diseases, the world community has not responded in
getting aid to areas of greatest need.
71
E. The Post-Doha Era: Lingering Issues
During the meeting at Doha, drafters of the declaration
readily recognized that the issue of compulsory licensing under
TRIPS was not globally inclusive. 72 Paragraph 6 stated that,
"We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no man-
ufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face
difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing
under the TRIPS Agreement."73 Many supporters of the need
for access to pharmaceuticals express that DCs and LDCs
should be allowed to use compulsory licensing if they have in-
sufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities.
74 How-
ever, some of the general interpretations of TRIPS would not
allow for an exception for countries to utilize compulsory licens-
ing for public health initiatives.
7 5
Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement allows compulsory li-
censing to be used domestically but not for exportation, which
68 See id. at 200.
69 See Julio Godoy, Health: AIDS Fund Falls Short of Expectations, INTER
PRESS SERV., Jul. 17, 2003.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 17.
73 Doha Declaration, supra note 38, para. 6.
74 See Sell, Access Campaign, supra note 16, at 517.
75 See Thomas A. Haag, Comment, TRIPS since Doha: How Far Will the WTO
Go Toward Modifying the Terms for Compulsory Licensing?, 84 J. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF. Soc'y 945, 953 (2002).
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creates a host of problems for DCs and LDCs.76 Despite strict
conditions set for utilizing compulsory licensing, there are no
limits on the grounds for issuing these licenses.77 Under
TRIPS, Article 31(b) states in part that, "This requirement may
be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
non-commercial use."7 8 The Doha Declaration clarified that
countries can determine the circumstances of a national emer-
gency, which can include public health epidemics.79 The decla-
ration also provided that the term "emergency" does not
necessarily constitute only short-term crises.80
The main obstacle DCs and LDCs face for utilizing compul-
sory licensing is found in Article 31(f) of the TRIPS agree-
ment.81 There are two intertwined issues within this section of
the TRIPS agreement. First, if a country cannot manufacture
the pharmaceutical product, it will not be able to import generic
drugs if the country exporting the drugs is under a compulsory
license.82 Second, when a country takes advantage of a compul-
sory license, the principal part of the manufacturing of the
pharmaceutical product must be to supply the country's domes-
tic market, which limits the quantity of medications that can be
exported.8 3
In addition, theoretical and logistic issues exist in sug-
gesting the use of compulsory licensing for DCs and LDCs to
fulfill their prescription drug needs.8 4 Although somewhat de-
batable, pharmaceutical companies claim that strong patent
regulations are needed to counterbalance the research and de-
velopment costs of pharmaceuticals.85 Also, countries must be
76 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31. See also Sell, Access Cam-
paign, supra note 16, at 500.
77 See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 13.
78 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31.
79 See Doha Declaration, supra note 38, para. 5(b)-(c).
80 See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 14.81 See Abbott, supra note 45. See also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art.
31(f). Article 31(f) follows that: "any such use shall be authorized predominantlyfor the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use . .. .
Id.
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 44.
85 See Ansari, supra note 60.
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able to manufacture the pharmaceutical product without the
support of the patent owner.8 6 In addition, a country must be
able to afford the royalties owed to the patent holder(s) to use
compulsory licenses 87
For countries that do manufacture generically equivalent
pharmaceuticals, there are prohibitions on large exportations of
lesser-priced drugs under compulsory licenses.8 8 Very few DCs
and LDCs have the capabilities to wholly produce the
pharmaceuticals they need,8 9 and import many of the products
to subsidize their pharmaceutical manufacturing industries.
90
Until TRIPS participation becomes mandatory in 2005, DCs
and LDCs that do not have the means of manufacturing
pharmaceuticals can take advantage of the exportation of ge-
neric medications by developed countries.91 Importation of ge-
neric medications into DCs and LDCs, however, will become
increasingly difficult after full TRIPS implementation, even
though these DCs and LDCS have until 2016 to comply with
TRIPS.92 Additionally, supplying countries may no longer be
able to export the pharmaceutical ingredients on which DCs
and LDCs have been relying (under Article 31(f)) after January
2005. 93
The Doha Declaration did not fully outline all of the flex-
ibilities available under the TRIPS agreement. 9
4 A remaining
option includes exceptions to the protection of test data under
Article 39.3 so that generic equivalents can be ready for market
upon the expiration of the patent.95 The exceptions to patent
rights under Article 30 are also vague and ambiguous, and sub-
ject to further interpretation. 96 Additionally, some DCs and
LDCs do not currently patent pharmaceuticals and therefore
cannot utilize standard compulsory licenses as a means of ac-
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 18.
90 See id.
91 See Ansari, supra note 60.
92 See Abbott, supra note 45.
93 See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 18.
94 See id. at 43.
95 See id.
96 Id.
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quiring medications.97 Other options may need to be created to
accommodate these countries, especially if they face public
health emergencies.
At the end of article 6 of the Doha Declaration, the Council
for TRIPS agreed to expedite the means of finding a resolution
to the "Paragraph 6" problem.98 The deadline was set for the
December 2002 to report back to the WTO General Council. 99
The TRIPS Council proposed the "December 16" or "Motta text,"
which had many provisions that would significantly complicate
the production of generic pharmaceutical products.100 The
"Motta Text" lacked the votes to be adopted; voters were swayed
by the viewpoints of many NGOs who found the text to be
ineffectual.l 0 l
F. Failure of Canclin WTO Ministerial to Settle Doha Issues
In August of 2003, the TRIPS Council again convened to
review the issues of exportation of pharmaceutical products us-
ing compulsory licensing.102 The decision of the Council was to
apply a temporary TRIPS waiver where eligible DCs and LDCs
can import generic equivalents of patented drugs from manu-
facturing countries under compulsory licensing regulations.103
This waiver will be in effect until TRIPS is amended.10 4 Many
countries opted out of the importation provisions, but some DCs
retained the rights to utilize the waiver under times of national
emergency. 105
The interim waiver contains a 12-step process that eligible
countries must follow to evade TRIPS pharmaceutical access
97 See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 44.
98 See Doha Declaration, supra note 38, para. 6.
99 See id.
100 Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines-M~decines Sans Fronti~res,
Doha Derailed: A Progress Report on TRIPS and Access to Medicines, ACCESSMED-
MSF.ORG 2, at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/cancunbriefing.pdf (Aug.
27, 2003) [hereinafter Doha Derailed].
101 See id.
102 World Trade Organization, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to
Cheap Drug Imports available at http://www.wto.orgenglish/news-e/pres03-e/
pr350e.htm (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter WTO Patent Obstacle].
103 See id.
104 Id.
105 See World Trade Organization, The General Council Chairperson's State-
ment at http://www.wto.orgenglish/news-e/news03-e/trips-stat_28aug03-e.htm
(Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Chairperson's Statement].
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barriers. 106 The steps include issuing voluntary and compul-
sory licenses, working with the exporting country, the private
manufacturer if involved, and the importing country.' 07 The
process is difficult to implement and must be repeated by the
exporting country each time there is a request for importing
pharmaceutical products by an eligible country.108 The Council
also explicitly restricted the use of compulsory licenses to those
covered by paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration in the
waiver.' 0 9
Some commentators thought that the waiver would be the
bridge to bringing trade negotiators and public health advo-
cates closer to reaching a workable solution to the pharmaceuti-
cal access barriers created by TRIPS. 110 However, two new
challenges have been created for DCs and LDCs by the interim
waiver. First, DCs and LDCs do not have a clear interpretation
of their limitations and autonomy to gain access to affordable
medications."' Second, DCs and LDCs will need to propose a
workable and lasting solution to amend the TRIPS agree-
ment. 11 2 Without the amendment, NGOs and public health
supporters warn that these new compulsory licensing terms do
not secure generic drug production for the future. 113 Even the
most recent WTO Ministerial Conference left remaining crucial
determinations about this issue unsettled.
114
III. PREPARING FOR THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE
AMERICAS (FTAA)
A. Purpose and Benefits of FTAA
There has been an increasing trend for WTO-participating
nations to negotiate regional trade agreements, a trend coined
106 See Carlos Correa, Access to Drugs Under TRIPS: A Not So Expeditious
Solution, ICTSD.ORG 21, at http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES8-1.pdf
(Jan. 2004).
107 See id.
108 See id. at 22.
109 See Chairperson's Statement, supra note 105.
110 See WTO Patent Obstacle, supra note 102.
111 See Correa, supra note 106, at 22.
112 See id.
113 See Flawed WTO drugs deal will do little to secure future access to
medicines in developing countries, DOCTORSWITHOUTBORDERS.oRG, at http://www.
doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2003/08-30-2003_pf.html (Aug. 30, 2003).
114 See Doha Derailed, supra note 100, at 1.
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"regionalism."115 There are several major initiatives happening
simultaneously. These include nations choosing regional trade
agreements (RTAs) over larger multilateral agreements, coun-
tries seeking to negotiate with new and distant partners, and
large "mega-blocs" of countries making one trade agreement,
such as the FTAA.116
The purpose of the FTAA is to increase the ease of trade
and investments in the Americas." 7 Along with the potential
for increased prosperity, the goals of the agreements include
supporting democracy, alleviating poverty and inequities, and
working with DCs and LDCs towards ongoing growth and de-
velopment in many sectors."18 The pending agreements are
very comprehensive, including agriculture, IP, tariffs, and other
trade-related items. 1 9
115 See C.P. Chandrasekhar & Jayati Ghosh, Regional Trade and Investment
Agreements, Bus. LINE, Jan. 20, 2004.
116 See id.
117 See generally Antecedents of the FTAA Process, The Preparatory Process,
FTAA-ALCA.oRG (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
118 See Free Trade Area of the Americas - FTAA: First Summit of the Americas:
Miami - December 19-11, 1994: Plan of Action, FTAA-ALCA.oRG (last visited Feb.
19, 2004) [hereinafter FTAA Plan of Action]. The FTAA Plan of Action lists
twenty-two goals in creating this agreement, including:
I. Preserving and Strengthening the Community of Democracies of the
Americas: 1. Strengthening Democracy, 2. Promoting and Protecting
Human Rights, 3. Invigorating Society/Community Participation, 4. Pro-
moting Cultural Values, 5. Combating Corruption, 6. Combating the Prob-
lem of Illegal Drugs and Related Crimes, 7. Eliminating the Threat of
National and International Terrorism, 8. Building Mutual Confidence; II.
Promoting Prosperity Through Economic Integration and Free Trade: 9.
Free Trade in the Americas, 10. Capital Markets Development and Liber-
alization, 11. Hemispheric Infrastructure, 12. Energy Cooperation, 13.
Telecommunications and Information Infrastructure, 14. Cooperation in
Science and Technology, 15. Tourism; III. Eradicating Poverty and Dis-
crimination in Our Hemisphere: 16. Universal Access to Education, 17.
Equitable Access to Basic Health Services, 18. Strengthening the Role of
Women in Society, 19. Encouraging Microenterprises and Small Busi-
nesses, 20. White Helmets-Emergency and Development Corps; IV.
Guaranteeing Sustainable Development and Conserving Our Natural En-
vironment for Future Generations: 21. Partnership for Sustainable En-
ergy Use, 22. Partnership for Biodiversity, 23. Partnership for Pollution
Prevention.
Id.
119 See Maria Julia Oliva, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: Little Opportunity
and Much Risk, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 45, 57 (2003).
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The United States is the primary negotiator in the FTAA
agreement and the smaller FTA with individual countries and
groups of countries. Creating this trade zone is a crucial and
strategic expansion for the United States because as of two
years ago, the US was only participating in 1 of the 30 FTAs in
existence in the Western Hemisphere. 120 Some commentators
also report that by formulating these regional agreements, the
larger developed countries have more influence over DCs and
LDCs during multilateral WTO agreement negotiations.
121
The US faces direct trade competition from the European
Union.1 22 By utilizing politically motivated trade negotiations
to create FTA with particular countries, and remaining at the
forefront of the multilateral FTAA, the US can effectively
counter the trade competition with the European Union.1 23 As
one commentator notes, "[m]aking agreements selectively per-
mits the United States to choose the terms on which it will al-
low certain countries access to its market.
1 24
B. Countries Prepare for FTAA Integration
In Central America, more than 1.8 million people live with
HIV/AIDS, and the disease is the second leading cause of death
in the region.1 25 Generic drug availability has been the only
facilitator of driving down prices for ARV drugs needed to treat
this population. 126 The pending FTAA agreement is impacting
the access to prescription medications in the countries of Cen-
tral and South in different ways, depending on how the country
chooses to negotiate with the United States in the smaller
120 Laura Altieri, Comment, Between Empire and Community: The United
States and Multilaterilism 2001-2003: A Mid-Term Assessment, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 847, 867 (2003).
121 See Chandrasekhar, supra note 115.
122 See id. at 866.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 877.
125 See Make Trade Fair for the Americas: Agriculture, Investment And Intel-
lectual Property: Three Reasons To Say No To The FTAA (Jan. 26, 2003), at http://
www.oxfam.org/eng/pdfs/pp03Ol26FTAA.pdf [hereinafter Make Trade Fair].
126 See Press Release, Medicines Sans Frontieres, Congressional Decree in
Guatemala Hinders Access to Medicines (Jul. 14, 2003) available at http://217.29.
194.251/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=236090A9-D94B-4720-8EOCC 6 6 E
7884E4F6&component=toolkit.article&method=fullhtml&CFID=41273&CFTO
KEN=27519176 [hereinafter Guatemala Hinders Access].
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FTAs. Below are three examples of how countries are preparing
for the FTAA by integrating IP laws into their own legal sys-
tems or participating in FTAs with the United States.
1. Guatemala
Approximately 67,000 people are living with HIV/AIDS in
Guatemala. 127 According to M~decines Sans Frontiers, only
1,500 of those afflicted are receiving ARV therapy due to the
cost of the treatment. 128 For those receiving treatment, the ap-
proximate cost per month ranges from $320 (USD) to $800
(USD), while the average monthly income in Guatemala is $160
(USD).129 At the present time, the medications in the ARV
course of therapy are not under patent in Guatemala, so the
generic drug market is accessible for NGOs and other groups to
assist the Guatemalan people in obtaining treatment for HIV/
AIDS.130
The Guatemalan Congress enacted the first IP restriction
on prescription medications in April of 2003.13 1 They enhanced
the Guatemalan Industrial Property Law to give five years of
market exclusivity to pharmaceutical manufacturers from the
date of registration of the drug patent in Guatemala. 132 The
impact of this decree is that the release of new, comparable ge-
neric drugs will be delayed because the drug regulatory agency
cannot use the inventor's data to approve generically equivalent
products during the exclusivity period.' 33 Unfortunately, this
law also extends to the production of pharmaceuticals even
where there is no patent on a particular drug.1'4 The restric-
tions on marketing authorization of test data create an access
barrier that cannot be remedied, as compared to patents, which
127 Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines-M~decines Sans Fronti~res,
Trading Away Health: Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines in the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Agreement, ACCESSMED-MSF.ORG, at http:ll
www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/FTAAdoc.pdf (Aug. 2003) [hereinafter Trading
Away Health].
128 See id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See Guatemala Hinders Access, supra note 126.
132 See id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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can be overridden by compulsory licensing procedures. 135 Cur-
rently, in Central America, Guatemala is the only country with
test data exclusivity laws. 136
2. Chile
Effective January 1, 2004, the FTA between Chile and the
United States was enacted. 137 The United States-Chilean FTA
includes several provisions that go beyond the TRIPS minimum
standards including compulsory licensing restrictions, limits on
test data use, and extended patent stipulations. 38 One of the
main negotiations was the use of a five-year protection on test
data, 39 which means that during this five-year period, the pat-
ent holder has exclusivity on its development data and generic
manufacturers cannot use the data to create less expensive ver-
sions of the pharmaceuticals while the drug is still under pat-
ent.' 40 In the long-term, test data exclusivity increases
medication prices, because generic competition will not be avail-
able when the medication comes off patent.'
41
In Chile, there are more than 20,000 people living with
HIV/AIDS. 142 The FTA provisions, first and foremost protect-
ing IP, are slated to have an enormous and deleterious effect on
the accessibility and affordability of ARV-therapy drugs and
others.' 43 The United States-Chilean FTA sets a precedent in
Central and South America for future bilateral FTA.144 The
United States has now solidified its bargaining power to include
higher IP standards in other FTA negotiations, similar to those
included in this agreement. 45
135 See Provisions in CAFTA Restrict Access to Medicines: Latin American and
Caribbean Countries Urged Not to Include Such Provisions in FTAA, ACCESSMED-
MSF.ORG, at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/publications.asp?scntid= 42 2 0 04 104 94
&contenttype=PARA& (Feb. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Provisions in CAFTA].
136 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
137 See Tanja Sturm, US-Chile FTA Negotiations Likely to Include "TRIPS-
Plus" Provisions, WORLD MARKETS ANALYsIs, Nov. 28, 2002.
138 See id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See South America: Chile at http://www.nationmaster.com/country/ci/
Crime (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
143 See Palser, supra note 14.
144 See id.
145 See generally Palser, supra note 14.
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3. Brazil
Brazil has been a model for the Latin American region on
providing access to affordable medications,146 especially to the
500,000 Brazilian people suffering from HIV/AIDS. 147 The gov-
ernment developed a national AIDS program to offer ARV ther-
apy to all citizens with HIV/AIDS using generic medications.14s
Brazil was able to provide medications by negotiating discounts
on pharmaceuticals and domestically manufacturing generic
medications. 49 Through this program, the Brazilian govern-
ment has reported a $2 billion (USD) savings over a 6-year pe-
riod and has saved at least another half-million people from
being infected.' 50 The Minister of Health attributes the success
"of free universal HIV care: [to] ... (1) committed leadership at
the top; (2) involvement of community and civil society groups
... and (3) affordable medicines." 151
Brazil is in a unique position among the South American
countries. It is considered an upper-middle-income country and
the largest economy in the region, and has full manufacturing
capabilities for pharmaceutical products. 152 However, the dis-
parity between the rich and poor is alarming, and this disparity
is an indicator of the inequalities of health status among the
Brazilian people, especially the poor.1 53
The government of Brazil has, so far, remained committed
to the health initiatives they have commenced despite pressures
from the US and other WTO members to force Brazil to comply
with proposed FTAA IP regulations. 54 Some analysts believe
that the US is pursuing bilateral and multilateral FTAs to po-
tentially isolate Brazil and other opponents to the US trade
stipulations.155 One commentator noted that in looking at the
FTAA from Brazil's perspective, "the FTAA is not a genuine
146 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
147 See South America: Brazil at http://www.nationmaster.com/country/br/
Health (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
148 See id.
149 See Lazzarini, supra note 28, at 128.
150 See id. at 129. See also Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
151 Id.
152 See Lazzarini, supra note 28, at 130. See also Correa, Implications of Doha,
supra note 4.
153 Id.
154 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
155 See Free Trade Deals, supra note 12.
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free-trade area at all but a preferential trading system that
benefits the United States at the expense of its Latin American
trading partners."15
6
IV. CLOSING THE DOOR ON PHARMACEUTICAL ACCESS IN
THE FTAA?
A. The Use of 'TRIPS-plus' Provisions in IP Legislation
The harsh IP rules that developed countries are trying to
push DCs and LDCs to legislate and incorporate into FTA and
the FTAA agreement go beyond the requirements of the TRIPS
agreement. 157 These stipulations are typically referred to as
'TRIPS-Plus' provisions. 158 The requirements include, "efforts
to extend patent life beyond the... TRIPS minimum, to tighten
patent protection, to limit compulsory licensing.. .or to limit ex-
ceptions which facilitate prompt introduction of generics."' 59
These provisions directly affect pharmaceutical patents.
One limitation is that the patent exclusivity would be extended
beyond the 20-year international standard, which was the mini-
mum standard set in the TRIPS agreement. 160 This is espe-
cially troublesome for generic drug development if a patent is
delayed at issuance.' 61 In addition, the proposed FTAA gives
pharmaceutical companies the authority to have increased test
data protection for 5 years. 162 This provision would also delay
the introduction of generic pharmaceutical products because
companies have to wait 5 years before even starting equivalent
drug development.' 63 The TRIPS agreement does not require a
test data minimum standard in IP legislation, but the United
States has added it to the 'TRIPS-Plus' provision
negotiations. 164
156 See id. (quoting Alex Gourevitch, Lula's Rules: Brazil Could Undo Bush's
Trade Scheme, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 8, 2002).
157 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
158 See id. (stating that, "'TRIPS-Plus' is a non-technical term, which refers to
any IP provision that is more stringent than the TRIPS Agreement requires.").
159 See 't Hoen, supra note 29, at 30.
160 See id.
161 See Sturm, supra note 137. See also Oliva, supra note 119, at 64.
162 See Make Trade Fair, supra note 125.
163 See id.
164 See US Pressure Threatening Access to Medicines in Central America:
CAFTA Negotiations Roll Back US Promises to Put Public Health Before Profits,
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While the proposed FTAA encompasses minimum IP stan-
dards similar to TRIPS, these rules have been cited as the most
stringent IP standards written to date. 165 There is much suspi-
cion that the United States has two agendas in these trade
agreements, one with the WTO in supporting DCs and LDCs
public health initiatives and the other in light of favorable trade
agreements that incorporate stricter IP provisions. 166 Accord-
ing to the FTAA Plan of Action, the United States should be
supporting the "equitable access to basic health services" and
"promoting and protecting human rights," both of which may be
found to include access to essential medicines.167
This double standard in trade negotiations was most re-
cently evident in the Cambodian accession to the WTO in Au-
gust 2003.168 Cambodia agreed to add 'TRIPS-Plus' provisions
to their IP legislation after much pressure from the United
States, despite their national patent law passed in 2003 that
excluded pharmaceutical patents until 2016 as per the Doha
Declaration. 169 The United States also has many tactics to em-
ploy when enforcing IP rules, utilizing provisions in the smaller
FTAs, the FTAA negotiations, the TRIPS agreement, and trade
sanctions against violating countries.' 7 0
Recently, several countries, concurrent with their bilateral
FTA negotiations with the US, have enacted tougher IP laws
than the TRIPS agreement required. 171 The laws were effective
immediately instead of in 2005, the developed countries' TRIPS
DOCTORSWITHOUTBORDERS.ORG, at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/pr/2003/
12:13-2003_pf.html (Dec. 13, 2003).
165 See David Vivas Eugui, Intellectual Property in the FTAA: New Imbalances
and Small Achievements. In BRIDGES: ICTSD ANALYSIS 18-22 (2002), at http:l
www.iprsonline/ictsd/docs/VivasBridgesYear6N8NovDec2002.pdf (last visited
Nov. 30, 2004).
166 See US Seeks Further Restrictions on Generic Medicines for Developing
Countries, DOCTORSWITHOUTBORDERS.ORG, at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.
org/pr/2003/08-25-2003_pf.html (Aug. 25, 2003).
167 See FTAA Plan of Action, supra note 118.
168 See Access to Medicines at the WTO: Countries Must Save Lives Before Cele-
brating Success, ACCESSMED-MSF.ORG, at http://www.accessmed-msf.orgtpublica-
tions.asp?scntid=12920039472&contenttype=PARA& (Sep. 11, 2003).
169 See id.
170 See Make Trade Fair, supra note 125.
171 See Nick Ashwell, Bilateral Trade Deal with US Takes Precedence Over
FTAA, Says Colombian Official, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Sept. 5, 2003. See
also Guatemala Hinders Access, supra note 126.
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compliance date. 172 In addition, the FTAA is a binding agree-
ment for all of the participating countries, so the IP require-
ments in this agreement would supersede the Doha
Declaration. The extended TRIPS compliance deadline of 2016
for DCs and LDCs would be rolled back to the signing date of
the FTAA. 17
3
Draft proposals of FTAs between the United States and
some Central and South American countries are limiting these
countries' abilities to utilize compulsory licensing.
174 Under the
FTAA and other agreements, participating countries would lose
much of the flexibility afforded in the Doha Declaration.
175
Countries would only be allowed the usage of compulsory licens-
ing "for public, non-commercial purposes, and during declared
national emergencies or other situations of extreme ur-
gency." 76 This is especially troublesome for the DCs and LDCs
countries of Central and South America who do not have inde-
pendent pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities
177 because
the ability to import ingredients or pharmaceutical products
will not be possible under the current draft of the FTAA.1
78
Some commentators warn that initiating patent programs
into DCs and LDCs may result in increased administration,
medication, and technology costs.' 79 This seems likely if DCs
and LDCs enact 'TRIPS-Plus' IP legislation, and are forced to
resort to more cumbersome patent exemptions to gain access to
medications. For these reasons, long-term benefits seem uncer-
tain, particularly for the poorest countries. Bernard P6coul, di-
rector of the Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines,
sponsored by M~decines Sans Fronti~res, stated, "Generic com-
petition is just starting to bring life-saving medicines into peo-
ple's reach, but if FTAA imposes stricter rules, drug prices will
172 See id.
173 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127.
174 See Oliva, supra note 119, at 65.
175 See id.
176 Id. at 66.
177 See Correa, Implications of Doha, supra note 4, at 13.
178 See Oliva, supra note 119, at 66.
179 See Ansari, supra note 60, at 66.
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inevitably shoot up. Developing countries must resist pressure
to negotiate their people's health."180
B. Current Status of FTAA Negotiations
In mid-September 2003, the United States entered into ne-
gotiations to create a multilateral agreement with Central
America.181 These talks were held in Managua, Nicaragua, and
many of the provisions on IP included 'TRIPS-Plus' provi-
sions.182 Near the end of December of 2003, several countries
entered into the US-Central America Free Trade Agreement(CAFTA).183 The participating countries included El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala.184 These countries are
some of the poorer countries worldwide, and the affordability of
pharmaceuticals is already severely distorted.185
The text of the agreement was made publicly available in
late January 2004 confirming the inclusion of 'TRIPS-Plus' pro-
visions.18 6 Assisting this negotiation were the recent IP provi-
sions included in the US-Chile FTA, new Colombian IP
legislation, and the current draft of the FTAA.187 Colombia is
also set to start its own bilateral FTA negotiations with the
United States in early 2004, concluding in July 2005.18 It is
speculated that the Andean Community Pact, including Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru, will most likely sign agreements similar to
CAFTA and the US-Colombian FTA. 8 9
IP standards have been a sticking point in the larger FTAA
negotiations.190 With the US signing the smaller FTAs contain-
ing 'TRIPS-Plus' provisions for IP protection (which apply to
180 FTAA agreement threatens access to affordable medicines in the Americas,
DOCTORSWITHOUTBORDERS.ORG, at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.orgtpr/2003/
08-28-2003_pf.html (Aug. 28, 2003).
181 See Henry Dummett, Central America to Discuss Generic Drugs with US atFree Trade Meeting, WORLD MARKETs ANALYsis, Sept. 11, 2003.
182 See id.
183 See Tanja Sturm, US-Central American FTA Set to Tighten IP Protection,
WORLD MARKETS ANALYsIS, Dec. 18, 2003.
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See Provisions in CAFTA, supra note 135.
187 See Sturm, supra note 184.
188 See Ashwell, supra note 171.
189 See id.
190 See Matthew Haggman, Peter Zalewski, A Plan for Access, BROWARD DMLY
Bus. REV., Nov. 19, 2003.
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many areas of IP, not just pharmaceuticals), the platform for
inclusion of these terms into the larger agreement has been es-
tablished. 191 Commentators have implied that the smaller
FTAs serve as the "insurance policy against the potential fail-
ure of the FTAA."192 Conversely, some countries are pushing
for the WTO to decide the issue. 193 There is agreement that
TRIPS standards should serve as the foundation for IP stan-
dards in the FTAA, but countries such as Brazil do not want to
increase the IP protection beyond minimum TRIPS
compliance.194
NGOs and other humanitarian groups continue to raise the
issue of the impact of infectious disease burdens in DCs and
LDCs that are not in the forefront of these negotiations.1
95
While HIV/AIDS is getting most of the press in the access to
pharmaceuticals campaign, there remain other diseases affect-
ing millions of people, yet the research and development for ef-
fective pharmaceuticals is not being conducted. 196 For example,
in Central and South America, 18 million people are afflicted
with Chagas disease and over 100 million are at risk of con-
tracting it.' 97 At present, only one pharmaceutical company is
pursuing any research on Chagas disease. 98 As the patent pro-
tections increase through the FTAA, research on Chagas dis-
ease and other infectious diseases that mainly affect the poor
will most likely decline because the pharmaceutical market is
not profitable. 199
Even as FTAA negotiations continue and more bilateral
and multilateral FTAs are signed with 'TRIPS-Plus' provisions,
there is another avenue of hope for better access to prescription
medications in DCs and LDCs. In October 2002, two Thai citi-
zens with HIV prevailed in a suit against Bristol-Myers Squibb
191 See id.
192 See Free Trade Deals, supra note 12.
193 See Haggman, supra note 191.
194 See id.
195 See Gustavo Gonzalez, FTAA Talks a Matter of Life and Death, MDs say,
INTER PRESS SERV., Nov. 19, 2003.
196 See Trading Away Health, supra note 127. Chagas disease, which is caused
by a parasite, afflicts mainly poor people as the parasite-transmitting insects live
in the walls of mud and straw homes.
197 See id.
198 See Gonzalez, supra note 196.
199 See id.
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and the Thai Department of Intellectual Property.200 The liti-
gation concerned the amendment of the patent on the ARV drug
didanosine by the defendants to include a dose restriction,
thereby extending its patent protection beyond the original
grant.201 Commentators reported that Thailand had been
under substantial trade pressure from the United States to im-
plement strict IP legislation at the expense of public health
initiatives .202
In finding for the plaintiffs, the court found that, "injured
parties . . . are not limited to manufacturers or sellers of
medicines protected by patent. Those in need of medicine are
also interested parties to the granting of the patent."203 This is
the first time where the Doha Declaration has been utilized in a
court ruling, supporting public health concerns over IP protec-
tions. 20 4 In addition, supporters of the access to essential
medicines campaign cite this decision as "set[ting] an important
precedent that essential drugs are not just another consumer
product but a human right, and that patients are injured by
patents."20 5 This case could have many potential ramifications
towards better access to medicines in the Americas despite the
current and proposed trade agreements.
V. CONCLUSION
The question still remains whether the price of drugs is re-
ally the focal issue. The WHO states that, "[aiccess to
medicines depends on many factors, notably rational selection
and use of drugs, adequate and sustainable financing, afforda-
ble prices, and reliable supply systems."206 Most drugs in DCs
and LDCs are obtained through self-funding due to a lack of
200 See Nathan Ford et al., The Role of Civil Society in Protecting Public Health
Over Commercial Interests: Lessons from Thailand, 363 LANCET 560, 561 (Nov. 14,
2004), at http://www.thelancet.com.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 562.
203 See id. at 561 (quoting Aids Access Foundation v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Company & Department of Intellectual Property. The Central Intellectual Prop-
erty and International Trade Court, BC Tor Por 34/2544, RC Tor Por 93/2545
(2 002)(Thail.).
204 See id.
205 See id. at 562.
206 HIV Newsletter, supra note 15.
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health insurance. 20 7 Countries do not have the infrastructure
to support public health initiatives such as disease screenings,
counseling, surveillance activities, and partner notification pro-
grams, which are especially needed for HIV/AIDS prevention
and treatment. 208 DCs and LDCs have a shortage of public
health staff, including nurses, doctors, and other health work-
ers, in addition to few facilities which have the experience to
provide treatment and monitor patients' drug regimens.
20 9
These countries also do not or are not able to provide commu-
nity resources including health education, drug treatment, or
mental health care, which are equally important social services
offered in most developed countries.
210
Further complicating the situation are the structural issues
countries face, including, "low levels of economic development,
frequent population migrations, political instability, gender ine-
quality, drug policies that promote risky behavior or further
marginalize drug users, and laws and policies that maintain
any of these conditions." 21 1 Due to their limited resources, the
importance of public health initiatives diminishes as a political
priority in these countries. 212 A different view of health factors
manifested by social epidemiologists encompasses, "fundamen-
tal determinants of health [such as] . .. income, socio-economic
status, social capital, social cohesion, and race/racism."
21 3
With either view, the world must help DCS and LDCS
determine:
how to guarantee government commitment and resources to pro-
vide access to pharmaceuticals, especially during difficult eco-
nomic times ... although the current intellectual property system
may be interpreted or modified, if necessary, to permit access to
drugs at affordable prices, the international community must still
fulfill the long-term need for sustainable domestic development
and public health capacity.
214
207 See id.
208 Lazzarini, supra note 28, at 128.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 115.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 116.
214 Lazzarini, supra note 28, at 136.
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As an example, ARV therapy treatment for HIV/AIDS is not
only expensive, but also requires a strict and complex schedule
for taking the medications.215 The rigidity of the treatment
schedule is to be followed to secure optimum drug performance,
and also helps to prevent the development of ARV therapy-re-
sistant strains of HIV.216
Potentially, the impact of issuing compulsory licenses, for
example, for these and other drugs could produce a lesser im-
pact than projected;217 however, the risk of not utilizing the op-
tions under TRIPS could lead to the revocation of the newest
waiver. Some commentators encourage cautious optimism,
stating that, "even in view of enormous human suffering due to
the HIV-AIDS epidemic, [an impact] may not automatically be
assumed, without further investigation, to be a 'measure neces-
sary to protect public health' as it may be required by TRIPS
Article 8."218 If countries can get the pharmaceutical products
at an affordable price, however, the incentive to develop and re-
fine the infrastructure to dispense medications is much more
likely.
There are a number of possible ways that trade agreements
and public health initiatives can coexist and benefit all parties
involved.219 The prescription drug needs of DCs and LDCs may
precipitate a new IP agreement or amendments to TRIPS provi-
sions affecting essential medication production and/or importa-
tion. Any changes to the agreement however would require a
three-fourths majority vote of WTO members. 220 A further ap-
proach could be that each country's pharmaceutical needs
would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine the ap-
propriate level of IP protection to be afforded. 221 Another possi-
bility includes adopting a "patently unreasonable" standard to
allow a country to procure evidence about its internal IP policy
standards, which might be in conflict with the TRIPS agree-
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ment.222 As the TRIPS provisions are mandatorily imple-
mented, the public health concerns of DCs and LDCs will most
likely be brought to the forefront. Hopefully, this will en-
courage these countries and developed countries to be better
global citizens about the world's health.
The FTAA is an important commitment to DCs and LDCs
from developed countries with existing effective public health
initiatives. 223 Unfortunately, these needs are being overlooked
during the FTAA negotiations and smaller FTAs due to the in-
fluence on negotiators to protect IP rights. As public awareness
of these issue grows, additional support for the public health
agendas of NGOs will most likely surface. Only then can the
pharmaceutical needs of the DCs and LDCs remain a top world-
wide priority.
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